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Cyber	risk	governance	should	take	centre	stage	in
financial	services
It	feels	as	though	cyber	risk	has	crept	up	on	us	without	warning	and	with	great	intensity.
We	have	come	a	long	way	from	the	days	when	our	palm	pilots	had	to	be	hot-sync’d	through	a	docking	station	and
the	occasional	hazard	was	from	viruses	transmitted	as	email	attachments.	Over	the	years,	we	have	embraced
extreme	connectivity	combined	with	extreme	automation	in	a	never-ending	drive	towards	convenience	and	cost-
efficiency.
However,	even	as	banks	continue	to	nudge,	cajole	(and	perhaps	occasionally	threaten)	their	customers	towards
impersonal	e-channels,	we	learn	about	record	amounts	of	losses	from	online	fraud	and	theft.	Furthermore,	all	of	us
–	not	just	the	specialists	–	are	asked	to	act	as	conscription	soldiers	in	the	fight	against	this	threat.
According	to	a	report	by	Accenture,	almost	eight	out	of	ten	business	leaders	believe	that	they	are	adopting	new
technologies	faster	than	they	can	address	related	security	issues.	It	also	estimates	that	nearly	$350	billion	of	value
could	be	lost	by	the	banking	sector	to	cybercrime	in	the	next	five	years.
Publicly-known	examples	across	various	sectors	include	the	NotPetya	cyber	attack	on	the	shipping	Group	Maersk,
the	WannaCry	attack	on	the	British	National	Health	Service	(NHS),	the	theft	of	reserves	from	Bangladesh	central
bank	via	the	SWIFT	network,	and	the	hacking	of	confidential	data	from	Sony	Film	Studios.
With	more	of	our	devices	integrated	through	“the	internet	of	things”	and	more	of	our	services	provided	by	an
assemblage	of	outsourced	specialists,	there	are	simply	more	points	of	entry	for	potential	attacks	or	lapses.	With	a
wide	diversity	of	digital	maturity,	capability	and	habits	of	‘cyber	hygiene’	amongst	us,	system	resilience	could	be
compromised	by	the	weakest	link.
At	the	same	time,	the	backdrop	for	international	cooperation	amongst	authorities	appears	particularly	bleak.	Back	in
April	2009,	at	the	height	of	the	global	financial	crisis,	governments	of	the	G20	came	together	with	a	robust,
comprehensive	and	effective	plan	of	action.	By	contrast,	with	alleged	state	involvement	in	certain	attacks,	countries
operate	as	“frenemies”	with	a	guarded	stance	on	issues	of	cyber.
There	is	a	conflict	between	the	need	for	the	seamless	sharing	of	threat-intelligence	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	desire
to	localise	data	within	national	borders	on	the	other.	There	may	also	be	cultural	differences	in	attitudes	towards
citizens’	privacy	vis-à-vis	the	state.	Finally,	cyber	threats	appear	to	be	highly	dynamic	as	attackers	harness	digital
tools	with	great	agility.	It	is	possible,	for	example,	for	quantum	computing	to	make	it	easier	to	break	current
encryption	methods.
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This	landscape	of	a	rough	neighbourhood	coupled	with	a	seemingly	underdeveloped	security	apparatus	at	the
international	level	poses	new	challenges	of	risk	management	for	the	financial	services	sector.	A	cyber	event	could
trigger	a	loss	of	confidence	possibly	through	compromising	the	integrity	of	data	on	which	the	flow	of	finance	relies.	It
could	in	turn	trigger	bank	runs,	liquidity	freezes	or	jumps	in	market	prices.	Whether	this	sustains	into	a	system-wide
crisis	or	not	would	depend	on	the	prudential	response	of	regulators,	as	argued	by	Danielsson	et	al	(2016).
In	the	words	of	Catherine	Bessant,	chief	operation	and	technology	officer	at	Bank	of	America,	“The	threat	is	huge
and	what	makes	it	difficult	for	boardrooms	is	that	it’s	hard	to	model;	it’s	a	risk	where	past	is	not	prologue”.
As	it	is,	unlike	credit	risk	or	market	risk,	operational	risk	(of	which,	cyber	risk	is	a	subset)	can	be	more	nebulous	in
its	framing.	The	Basel	Committee	on	Banking	Supervision	(BIS)	issued	guidance	on	sound	practices	for	the
management	and	supervision	of	operational	risk	in	2003,	later	updated	in	2011.	A	more	recent	BIS	publication
“Cyber-resilience:	Range	of	Practices”	(December	2018)	catalogues	a	sweep	of	activities	by	both	banks	and
regulators.
Quantifying	cyber	risk	is	difficult.	Any	rigorous	process	requires	data	(internal	and	external),	assumptions	and
subjective	estimates	made	by	a	risk	committee.	That	is	why	the	qualitative	aspects	of	the	approach	and	framework
are	so	important.	As	is	the	need	to	perform	table-top	war	games.
Regulators	expect	that	institutions	would	build	systems	that	are	“secure	by	design”	with	an	emphasis	on	resilience
against	threats	rather	than	compliance	to	a	standard	checklist.	The	roles	and	responsibilities	of	members	of	the
board,	senior	management	and	other	key	posts	must	be	articulated	explicitly	and	without	ambiguity.	Staff	in	cyber-
related	functions	must	have	the	required	capabilities	and	some	jurisdictions	have	implemented	specific	cyber-
certifications.	There	is	ample	spotlight	on	the	contractual	framework	and	governance	of	outsourcing	activities,
seeking	to	ensure	that	nothing	falls	through	the	cracks.	Regulators	are	also	keen	to	calibrate	the	regulatory	burden
to	the	size	and	significance	of	the	service	provider	so	as	not	to	discourage	innovation	by	fintech	start-ups.
For	large	traditional	banks,	the	organisational	design	and	cultural	slant	towards	cyber	risk	is	still	a	work	in	progress.
Should	compliance	officers	sit	with	operations	or	the	legal	department?	Are	there	sufficient	separation,
communication	and	challenge	amongst	the	‘three	lines	of	defence’?	Does	the	chief	information	security	officer
(CISO)	have	the	required	seniority	or	stature	within	the	organisational	chart?	Does	she	come	from	a	technology,
legal	or	crime-enforcement	background?	Do	the	board	and	senior	management	appreciate	that	new	products,
markets	or	cost-reduction	measures	must	be	road-tested	against	their	impact	on	cyber	risk,	or	is	that	an	after-
thought?
What	are	the	norms	of	information	sharing	within	banks,	between	banks,	and	between	banks	and	regulators?
Incident	reporting	from	banks	to	regulators	is	mandatory	in	most	places.	This	may	include	the	requirement	to	submit
a	root-cause	analysis	and	a	post-mortem	of	lessons	learnt.	However,	there	are	gaps	in	the	other	lines	of
communication:	between	regulators	across	jurisdictions,	from	regulators	to	banks,	and	amongst	banks	(possibly
due	to	perceived	stigma).	According	to	the	BIS	(2018),	“full	adoption	of	all	types	of	information-sharing
arrangements	within	a	jurisdiction	is	still	exceptional”.
Finally,	banks	need	to	continue	to	refine	their	taxonomy	of	controls,	risk	classification,	indicators	and	a	book	of
tangible	items	that	can	serve	as	metrics	for	their	cyber	risk	control	environment.	That	dashboard	could	include	items
such	as	cyber-incident	response	playbooks,	recovery	plans,	vulnerability	scans	to	password	and	encryption	policy
to	training	statistics,	near-miss	events	etc.
Unfortunately,	cyber	risk	is	here	to	stay.	The	sooner	we	can	adopt	a	shared	language,	a	convergent	framework	and
an	elevated	awareness	of	this	risk,	the	better	prepared	we	would	be	to	strengthen	our	defence	and	resilience	to	this
risk.
Also	from	Lutfey	Siddiqi:
Can	a	post-Brexit	UK	trade	more	in	financial	services	with	ASEAN?
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This	blog	post	is	based	on	the	author’s	remarks	at	the	World	Economic	Forum	Annual	Meeting	on
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Cybersecurity,	13	November	2019,	and	the	LSE	Systemic	Risk	Centre	event	“Engineering	Financial	Instability
on	2	December	2019.
The	post	gives	the	views	of	its	author(s),	not	the	position	of	LSE	Business	Review	or	the	London	School	of
Economics.
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